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Federal Civil Procedure. Payphone LLC v. Brooks Fiber
Comm., 126 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.R.I. 2001). A corporation may not
pierce its own corporate veil or apply the alter ego doctrine for its
own benefit, nor may it employ these doctrines to create diversity
jurisdiction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiff PayPhone LLC sued Brooks Fiber Communications
(BFC-RI) for negligence and breach of contract.' PayPhone operated pay telephones in the New England area and had its principal
place of business in Rhode Island. 2 During the early summer of
1999, a great many fraudulent phone calls were made to Puerto
Rico and the Dominican Republic over a six-week period. 3 An error
in the switching process allowed callers to direct-dial long distance
phone calls. 4 The cost of the fraudulent calls was approximately
$98,000 billed to PayPhone.6
Payphone contended BFC-RI's switch should have recognized
the number used to access the long distance service as invalid and
should not have completed the calls. 6 Additionally, PayPhone alleged that although the co-defendant, Cable and Wireless, Inc.
(C&W) was aware that PayPhone's public phones were programmed so that direct-dialed international calls would be placed
through a live operator, C&W allowed a large number of calls to be
7
completed in violation of the programming instructions.
BFC-RI removed the proceeding to federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction and PayPhone moved to remand to state
court.8 A hearing before the Magistrate Judge was held on May
16, 2000 to determine the citizenship of defendant, BFC-RI. In
that hearing, BFC-RI persuaded the Magistrate Judge that it was
a citizen of Mississippi owing to the fact that its great-grandparent
corporation, MCI WorldCom (MCI) was located there.9 BFC-RI
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maintained that it and MCI disregarded their separate corporate
identities and therefore BFC-RI satisfied the requirement of complete diversity. The Magistrate Judge denied PayPhone's motion
to remand and PayPhone filed a timely notice of appeal.' 0
ANALysis AND HOLDING

Precedent in the First Circuit has established the rule that a
corporation may not pierce its own corporate veil or employ the
alter ego doctrine to benefit itself, nor may it utilize either of these
doctrines in order to establish diversity jurisdiction. 1 The court
held that as a matter of law, BFC-RI should not have been allowed
to argue that it and MCI had ignored separate corporate identities. 12 The court posited two reasons for this: First, the alter ego
and corporate veil doctrines are reserved for the relief of aggrieved
third parties. 13 Second, allowing a corporation to choose its citizenship in order to create or maintain diversity jurisdiction would
be contrary to Congress's intent to limit federal diversity jurisdic14
tion and reduce the federal diversity caseload.
The court went on to hold that BFC-RI was precluded from
piercing its own corporate veil by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 15 In Rhode Island, equitable estoppel is established by "proof
of an affirmative statement ... by the person against whom the
estoppel is claimed which is directed at the person seeking to establish the estoppel, and that the statement or conduct actually
induces the other to act... to his injury."1 6 The court found ample
evidence to establish this requirement.
First, when BFC-RI sought authorization to do business in
Rhode Island, it made representations to the Rhode Island Public
Utilities Commission (P.U.C.) that Rhode Island was the only state
where it planned to do business. 17 Second, when BFC-RI and MCI
WorldCom merged in 1998, the companies again had to obtain approval from the P.U.C. as required by Rhode Island law.' 8 At that
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.

524 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
time, both companies stated to the P.U.C. that BFC-RI would operate as a separate corporation following the merger.1 9 By making
these representations, the court held that BFC-RI had held itself
out to both P.U.C. and the public as a local company providing local service. 20 As such, PayPhone was induced to do business with
BFC-RI. 2 1 The court held that allowing BFC-RI to "recharacterize"
itself as a citizen of Mississippi would be misleading and detrimental to PayPhone. 22 Therefore, BFC-RI was estopped from claiming
23
diversity of citizenship.
CONCLUSION

A corporation is not allowed to pierce its own corporate veil to
create a diversity of citizenship or to otherwise benefit itself; therefore, the magistrate judge's denial of PayPhone's motion to remand
to state court was contrary to law. 24 The-court held it had no subject matter jurisdiction because there was no diversity of citizenship between BFC-RI and PayPhone, LLC. The case was
remanded to Rhode Island Superior Court. 26
Jill A. Taft

19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.

